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Abstract. This study is positioned at the intersection of legitimation and 
international entrepreneurship theories. It is a longitudinal ethnographic case 
study that explores the process of emergence of an international new software 
venture from an emerging economy and the effect this venture has on the 
process of industry creation in that economy. Data were collected over a two 
year period, 2010-2011, via in-depth interviews, observations, and unobtrusive 
data. Data analysis reveals three different contexts in which legitimation took 
place: legitimation of the new venture domestically and internationally, and 
legitimation of the new industry. To acquire cognitive legitimacy and socio-
political legitimacy and successfully internationalize, an international new 
venture needs to design a robust business model targeting both internal and 
external stakeholders, engage in persuasive argumentation invoking familiar 
cues and scripts, promote and defend incentives and operating mechanisms in 
political negotiations, and overcome the country-of-origin effect by pursuing a 
technology legitimation strategy. 
Keywords: Internationalization, legitimation, software, new venture, emerging 
industry, emerging economy, ethnography. 
1 Introduction 
In this longitudinal ethnographic case study we explore the process of emergence of a 
software international new venture (INV) from an emerging economy and the effect 
an INV has on the process of industry creation in that economy. More specifically, 
drawing on institutional theory, we focus on how an emerging economy INV acquires 
legitimacy and how this INV contributes to the legitimation of the new industry 
within which it operates. 
With this study we aim to contribute to the advancement of the growing 
international entrepreneurship research field [1]. To achieve this aim, we address 
herein a number of criticisms of the field. The extant international entrepreneurship 
research suffers from coverage bias [2] by focusing mostly on high-technology INVs 
from developed economies [3]. It also suffers from theoretical paucity [4] and needs 
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to borrow more actively from other disciplines in order for a robust international 
entrepreneurship theory to emerge [2]. To this criticism, we may add that research on 
legitimation in international business and research in international entrepreneurship 
are, respectively, in an embryonic stage [5] and virtually non-existent [4]. 
We define an INV as a new venture that aims to derive profits from international 
activities right from their inception or immediately thereafter [6]. The emergent 
nature of the INV and of the new industry suggests that both initially lack legitimacy 
and credibility [7]. Moreover, uncertain decision-making settings characterize a new 
industry in which decisions are made under conditions of technology and market 
uncertainty, as well as goal ambiguity [8]. As to the emerging nature of an economy, 
the most important criterion defining an emerging economy is how well it helps 
buyers and sellers to come together, implying that an emerging economy falls short to 
varying degrees in providing the institutions necessary to support basic business 
operations [9]. 
We explore the legitimation process of MDsoft1, an INV in an emerging economy, 
the Republic of Moldova. MDsoft is in the business of custom software development. 
Data collection took place over the period of two years: 2010-2011. Data were 
collected using several methods: in-depth interviews with the top management team 
and founders of MDsoft as well as a number of key stake-holders; observations, since 
one of the authors is the co-founder of MDsoft; and unobtrusive data.  
2 Theoretical Background 
The process of new venture emergence can be understood and predicted by viewing it 
as a quest for legitimacy [10]. From the institutional theory perspective, legitimacy 
plays a key role in overcoming the liability of newness [11] and the liability of 
foreignness [12] that shape the behavior of INVs in the early years of their existence 
[13]. We define legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, beliefs, and definitions” [14, p574]. In the early stages of their 
emergence, new ventures lack cognitive legitimacy, defined as knowledge about the 
new activity and what is needed to succeed in an industry, and socio-political 
legitimacy, defined as the value placed on the new activity by cultural norms and 
political authorities [15].  
To acquire these types of legitimacy, new ventures seek various legitimation 
strategies in order to enhance their survival and facilitate the transition to other forms 
of organizing activities [16]. Several theoretical perspectives related to new venture 
legitimation strategies can be identified. For example, new ventures may seek 
legitimacy via conformance strategy [14] that aims at achieving conformity within the 
demands and expectations of the existing social structure in which the venture is 
currently positioned; in other words, it means to follow the rules [17]. New ventures 
may also pursue selection strategy [14] that allows them to select a favorable 
geographic location where there are organizations that conform to similar rules, 
norms, values and models and may provide a new venture with legitimacy. An 
                                                          
1 The name of the company and the names of interviewees are disguised throughout the paper. 
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example would be for a software new venture to locate its operations in Silicon 
Valley, California, US or Silicon Glen, Scotland [18]. Through a manipulation 
strategy [14] new ventures may make changes in the environment to achieve 
consistency between the venture and its environment.  
When an industry is in the early years of its formation [19], it poses additional 
challenges and pressures on INVs’ quest for legitimacy as there are no or few 
precedents for the kind of activities they want to found [7; 20]. In such context, new 
ventures may pursue creation legitimation strategy that “...involves developing 
something that did not already exist in the environment” [21, p425], such as, new 
operating practices, norms, values, beliefs, expectations, models, patterns of behavior, 
and networks. It is theorized that this strategy is especially evident during the 
introductory stage of new industries [21]. 
The extant empirical research on legitimation of new ventures and new industries 
highlights a number of symbolic legitimation strategies available to new ventures, 
such as  credibility, defined as personal capability and personal commitment to the 
venture; professional organizing, defined as professional structures and processes; 
organizational achievement, defined as partially working products and technologies, 
venture age and number of employees; and quality of stakeholder relationships, 
defined as prestigious stakeholders, and personal attention [22]. To the above, INVs 
may pursue technology legitimation strategy to validate a technology or know-how; 
market legitimation strategy to better understand the market; operating legitimation 
strategy to have an optimal organizational gestalt; locational legitimation strategy to 
overcome the disadvantages of foreignness; alliance legitimation strategy to mitigate 
the risk of newness and smallness; and anchoring legitimation strategy to 
intentionally misrepresent the facts [23].    
As to the legitimation strategies related to the introduction of an institutional 
change or the creation of new organizational form or practice, the extant research 
suggests that in order for a new form or activity to become more of a taken-for 
granted practice, or for an institutional change to be instilled, they have to be 
theorized [24; 25]. The key steps of the process of theorization are problem 
specification by framing the problem and justification by invoking professionals’ 
values [24]. If the irregularities are not problematized, then extant theory will not be 
challenged, and rogue activities will wane or persist in a marginalized fashion [25]. 
Theorizing is thus not a momentary act but, one that requires sustained repetition to 
elicit a shared understanding of the problem [24]. In relation to the above, three sets 
of critical legitimation strategies may be available to new ventures: bridging diverse 
stakeholders; theorization of new practices (framing problems and justifying new 
practices and political negotiations); and institutionalization of new practices (by 
attaching them to preexisting organizational routines and reaffirming their alignment 
with stakeholder values on an ongoing basis) [26].  
When ‘innovations meet institutions’, robust design mediates between 
institutionalized design and technical innovation [27]. An innovation's design is 
defined as robust “…when its arrangement of concrete details are immediately 
effective in locating the novel product or process within the familiar world, by 
invoking valued schemas and scripts, yet preserve the flexibility necessary for future 
evolution, by not constraining the potential evolution of understanding and action that  
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follows use” [27, p479]. The robust design reduces the uncertainty linked to the new 
activity, and ensures that the main stakeholders would consider the new activity 
legitimate.  
When the venture and the industry are in their early stage of formation, the 
challenge ultimately lies in finding familiar cues that locate and describe new ideas 
without binding users too closely to the old ways of doing things [27]. That is, as new 
technologies emerge, entrepreneurs and innovations must find the balance between 
novelty and familiarity, between impact and acceptance. Furthermore, new venture 
conformity to norms and practices will legitimate only to the extent that those norms 
and practices are themselves legitimate, credible, and valued [28]. It may be thus 
argued that in order to successfully legitimatize the new venture in an emerging, new 
industry, the entrepreneur will have to change and/or create new “structural meaning” 
[29, p158] of norms, practices and values at macro, mezzo, and micro levels. It could 
be further argued that successful attainment of the legitimacy threshold “below which 
the new venture struggles for existence and probably will perish and above which the 
new venture can achieve further gains in legitimacy and resources” [21, p427] will 
depend on the success of transformations that entrepreneurs will induce at the macro, 
mezzo, and micro levels. This challenge is further amplified by the emergent nature of 
the economy within which the new venture emerges. In this study we explore how 
entrepreneurs of new ventures change and create new structural meaning not only at 
the macro, mezzo, and micro levels, but also at the international level in an attempt to 
gain cognitive and socio-political legitimacy in an emerging industry. 
3 Method 
Given the scarcity of empirical work regarding the internationalization and 
legitimation of INVs from emerging economies [3], we use a single, longitudinal 
ethnographic case study in line with a theory-building research design [30].2 Our 
interest in this study is to explore the process of legitimation of an emerging economy 
INV and its impact on the process of industry creation within which it emerges, 
aiming to advance international entrepreneurship theory.  
The case company was purposefully selected following sampling strategies 
pertinent to inductive, theory building research. We followed the intensity sampling 
strategy, the logic and power of which lies in selecting information-rich cases that 
manifest the phenomenon intensely, but not extremely [32] and in which the 
phenomenon of interest is transparently observable [33]. The selected case also had to 
resemble an INV as defined earlier [6], and be located in an emerging economy.  
Based on the above sampling criteria, we selected for studying in depth MDsoft as 
an INV from an emerging economy, the Republic of Moldova. MDsoft started-up in 
2000 with 4 people and grew over the span of 10 years to a medium-sized company 
with more than 500 employees, reaching an operating turnover of approximately 28 
                                                          
2 Examples of extant longitudinal, ethnographic field work could be found in [25] and [31] that 
examine the construction of legitimacy and identity during the life cycle of an entrepreneurial 
Internet firm [31] and how innovation in activities lead to the establishment of a new practice 
via institutionalization [25]. 
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million Euros. According to various rating agencies [34; 35; 36],3 Moldova is 
considered as an emerging, factor-driven economy making marginal progress in 
fostering sound macroeconomic management and enhancing the entrepreneurial 
climate, scoring low on business freedom, investment freedom, corruption and labor 
freedom, as well as on protecting investors and enforcing contracts.  
Our data collection and analysis occurred over a period of two years: 2010-2011. 
Data were collected using several methods: in-depth interviews, participant 
observation and unobtrusive data collection. We interviewed the top management 
team and founders of MDsoft who were driving the start-up process (six interviews). 
We also interviewed key stakeholders of MDsoft, e.g., the director of the industry 
association; the deputy minister of ICT; and two academics from the Technical 
University who were actively involved at that time (2000-2001) in the process of 
industry creation. We also collected observational data since one of the authors of this 
study was the co-founder of MDsoft.  
Unobtrusive data [37] were collected at length to contribute further to the 
triangulation of the data that were emerging from the interviews. The unobtrusive data 
consisted of (i) running records, such as legislative initiatives and bills, and (ii) 
episodic and private records, such as company sales, financial and organizational 
records, industrial and institutional records.   
We followed inductive theory-building strategies to analyze the data. We created a 
data-base for the case to organize and document all collected data, thus contributing 
to the enhancement of the reliability of the study. To ensure further reliability, the 
following key activities of the case study protocol were adopted in the present study: 
negotiating access; writing the history of the case and highlighting the phenomenon of 
interest by exhausting all secondary sources prior to interviews; validating the history 
of the company at the first interview; negotiating access to the stakeholders of the 
company; and negotiating access for follow-up interviews.  
Transcribed interviews were sent back to interviewees for review and comments 
that were incorporated for further analysis. Along with such multiple sources of 
evidence (for the purpose of triangulation), the interviewees’ feedback contributed to 
the construct validity of the study. Explanation-building was conducted by describing 
and exploring the case in narrative form and constantly comparing emergent 
constructs and theory with the extant literature, thus contributing to internal validity. 
According to Dubin [38], the very essence of description is to name the properties of 
things, and the more adequate the description, the greater the likelihood that the 
concepts derived from the description will be useful in subsequent theory building.  
The within-case analysis [32] was the basis for developing early constructs 
surrounding legitimation of MDsoft and of the industry within which MDsoft 
operated. We then further theorised in an attempt to move to a higher level of 
(analytical) generalizability, thus contributing to the external validity. During this 
process of data analysis we employed theoretical coding [39] to conceptualize the 
emerging patterns within the case, and middle-range theorizing [40] to help manage 
the complexity of the emergent patterns. The sampling strategy adopted, as well as the 
sampling criteria developed also contributed to external validity of the study.  
                                                          
3 Note that the Republic of Moldova started being included in the ranking calculations from 
2004/2005. 
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4 Findings 
Analysis of the data collected reveals three different contexts in which legitimation 
took place. The credibility of MDsoft needed to be established in Moldova, as did the 
wider software sector it played a key role in pioneering. A different set of challenges 
was faced by the sales arm of the business in the UK market, UKsoft. Some of the 
strategies deployed in legitimating the business in these contexts were found in the 
data collected; these are presented below. 
4.1 Legitimating MDsoft in Moldova 
The British investor (the “Investor”) had previously co-founded a technology business 
that had achieved a successful IPO on the London Stock Exchange and, by the year 
2000, was performing strongly in the dynamic dot.com economy. Before and 
concurrently with that he had held academic posts in the UK and published his work 
in international journals. The accessibility via the Internet of a corpus of research 
output and positive media coverage provided a vital source of independent validation 
for the member of MDsoft’s founding team who would otherwise have been hardest 
to evaluate in Moldova. 
The three Moldovan founders were also able to demonstrate significant prior 
credibility as managers and technologists in the local context. For example, the 
Chairman had been a co-author of the Moldovan Declaration of Independence from 
the USSR and had served for almost a decade as a Member of Parliament and 
respected public figure; by background, he was a professor of computer science and 
holder of a number of technology patents. The CTO had formerly held the same post 
in the country’s leading ISP business. 
The Silicon Valley vision of startup technology companies being founded in 
garages by college drop-outs with nothing more than drive and ingenuity was 
completely alien to Moldova in 2000. In a culture that requires serious ventures to be 
led by serious people, referenceable accomplishments of the founders contributed to a 
bedrock of credibility from which MDsoft could begin to build its institutional 
legitimacy. 
The quest for seriousness continued in MDsoft’s approach to human resources. To 
begin with, in the absence of competition, it was possible to hire – literally – the 
smartest young engineers and mathematicians in the country. In the words of the 
Chairman, a former professor: 
“With the support of my friends from local universities, we were able to find 
very quickly a team of talented young Moldovans, many of them participants 
and winners of International Olympiads.” 
The founders consciously set out to promote a culture of excellence in the new 
venture. They embraced the idea, famously espoused by Steve Jobs of Apple, that “A 
players like to work with A players” [41, p363]. Employees were encouraged to 
suggest and help recruit the programmers they most admired. Several respected 
university professors of computer science were among the early hires. 
In its third year the business established a new department dedicated to education 
and training. Courses were taught in new technologies and project management, and 
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all staff was required to learn English up to specified standard. Each member of staff 
had a personal development plan with clear objectives and regular monitoring. 
In addition to investment in staff excellence, a quality system and set of operating 
processes was developed for the business. It its fourth year the company achieved 
ISO-9001 certification, and quickly added many other technical and business 
accreditations. 
The company’s conspicuous commitment to excellence became a prominent 
feature of its identity and helped to legitimate it, not just to the current and potential 
staff but also to the wider community. This was reinforced in its fourth year when the 
business sponsored the creation of the country’s first university Chair of Software 
Engineering. 
In pursuit of socio-political legitimacy, the Investor and Chairman devoted 
considerable time and effort to articulating the vision and purpose of the business in 
the Moldovan media and with prominent figures in business and politics.  
A more mundane, but hugely important, contribution to the company’s legitimacy 
resulted from its policy of proactively paying all legitimate taxes and never paying 
any illegitimate taxes, i.e., bribes. When the company was founded, rates of tax 
recovery in Moldova were extremely low, both from businesses and individuals. 
Against the general pattern, MDsoft kept only one set of accounts and promptly paid 
all taxes. By this simple means it established an identity with the authorities almost 
overnight as one of the best corporate citizens in the country. In the year after the 
business was established the Investor and the Chairman were summoned to see the 
Deputy Prime Minister who was struggling to understand how it could be that a new 
business was already contributing more tax per month than any single county in 
Moldova. As the Chairman explained: 
“From the very beginning we set three major goals – to have offices in 
Moldova and Romania, provide competitive salaries, and work transparently. 
These goals helped us to build a reliable and competitive company. During 
the first four years [MDsoft] continuously doubled its staff; by the end of 
2005 we had around 145 employees.” 
In the context of the country’s developing institutions it was not always possible 
simply to obey the law; sometimes it was necessary to help define it. For example, in 
its third year the company was presented with a large tax bill in respect of VAT (i.e. 
purchase tax). By law this had to be levied on all goods and services sold in Moldova. 
The software that MDsoft developed was sold outside of Moldova, chiefly in the UK, 
but no physical goods were transported out of the country, so the law was somewhat 
vague with respect to VAT. According to the Chairman: 
“It was very difficult to demonstrate to [the Government] that we indeed 
export our services, and to argue and use relevant data on how software 
services can be delivered via Internet without any customs approvals.” 
Tax officials privately agreed with the company that software exports should be 
VAT-exempt, but none dared to implement their opinion for fear that their decision in 
the absence of legal clarification would be interpreted as resulting from receipt of 
bribes. Thus MDsoft was required to pursue a legal action all the way to the Supreme 
Court, which decided in its favor and established the interpretation of VAT law relied 
upon by the country’s software industry to this day. 
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The existence of MDsoft, a British-backed company, was acknowledged to be one 
of the factors that led the British government to open an embassy in Moldova for the 
first time. Formally opening the embassy, a member of the British Royal Family 
delivered a speech before the President, Prime Minister, assembled VIPs and media, 
in which he warmly eulogized MDsoft’s vision and achievements, thereby effectively 
putting the company’s socio-political legitimacy beyond doubt. 
4.2 Legitimating the Software Sector in Moldova 
In the year 2000 the idea that Moldova could address global markets with knowledge 
products, such as custom software, could easily be dismissed as foolish [6]. Speaking 
about the first time the idea of software development for foreign markets was 
presented to him, MDsoft’s Chairman reflected: 
“When I met one of my former students who told me that he and one of his 
friends were planning to launch a software company together with a British 
investor, I expressed my eagerness to join them, but it was like a joke – a joke 
I wanted to be a reality.” 
The existence of successful analogous models was used as a resource, first by the 
British Investor and subsequently by the wider founding team, to argue for the 
plausibility of a software sector that initially seemed little more then fantasy. 
Specifically, the success of the Indian offshore software development sector was used 
to inspire optimism. Most people were willing to concede that some of the challenges 
of poverty and underdevelopment in India surpassed even those of Moldova. Most 
were also willing to concede that a priori India was an even less likely location than 
Moldova to give birth to a software industry with global reach. And yet, the facts 
spoke for themselves – India provided a clear existence proof that a well-conceived 
export-oriented software industry could emerge from the midst of economic despair to 
conquer global markets. 
MDsoft’s founders appealed to the Indian example often over the first few years, 
but they were also able to reference comparable small scale, but still encouraging 
initiatives in the immediate neighbors Romania and Ukraine, and in other countries of 
the region, such as Russia, Czech Republic and Hungary. 
Many Moldovans were justifiably proud of the country’s heritage of Soviet 
technical education,4 so the idea that Moldovan software engineers could stand 
shoulder-to-shoulder with international competitors was not completely implausible, 
even if it was hard to envisage how organizational structures could be financed and 
realized. Within its first two years, MDsoft itself came to be cited as a Moldovan 
existence proof in media and public policy discussions that the dream of a Moldovan 
software sector was not completely foolish. 
Around four years after MDsoft launched, the Moldovan government introduced a 
package of generous tax reliefs specifically targeting the IT sector to encourage 
                                                          
4 During the Soviet Union era, Moldova was promoted externally as an agricultural country in 
an attempt to disguise the presence of a dozen large high-technology enterprises and R&D 
centers that were involved in full-scale and component production and R&D activities mainly 
for the naval and aerospace Soviet war military complex. One of the co-authors worked for 
one of these companies and had access to four other enterprises.   
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inward investment. This legislated incentivization played an important role in driving 
the expansion of existing software businesses and the establishment of new ones.  
In 2008 the Moldovan Association of Private ICT Companies was formed as a 
forum for larger businesses in the sector; at the time of writing, it has 37 corporate 
members [42] According to government figures there are now more than 1,500 ICT 
companies in the country, contributing approximately 10% of GDP, with 70% of the 
production of software companies being exported. 
4.3 Legitimating UKsoft in the UK 
UKsoft is MDsoft’s sales, marketing and customer relationship partner in the UK 
within the same corporate group. UKsoft was the first business to sell software 
development services from Moldova into the UK. In a context where most potential 
customers had never heard of Moldova, the company initially sought to legitimate 
itself for purposes of selling on a combination of the founders’ track records and 
pricing that was “too cheap to ignore”. As the Investor, who was initially also the sole 
member of UKsoft’s staff, recalls: 
“When I started to go out selling I had to say to companies, ‘Please send 
your mission critical software development projects to a country you have 
never heard of, to a company that has no track record, contracting with a 
one-person British company – and you have no way of verifying any of my 
claims.’ ” 
Initial sales were small, non-strategic for the customer, and with deeply discounted 
pricing. This created a number of modest case studies of successful delivery. The first 
significant enterprise sale was to develop an online portal providing pay-per-view 
access to a video library of high culture stage events, such as opera, ballet and theatre. 
The sale was closed largely on the strength of the Investor’s prior standing with the 
customer’s CTO. The project proved to be highly demanding for MDsoft, 
encompassing major learning steps in technology and business. However, the end 
result was a visually striking, richly functional media portal that compared favorably 
with systems developed by global leaders.  
Because of this, MDsoft came to the attention of a global technology company, 
BIGsoft,5 which was planning to test the consumer appetite for pay-per-view live 
streaming media events. They organized a concert starring an A-list pop performer as 
their test event. When they began looking for a supplier to develop an online 
payments solution to process potentially very large numbers of ticket sales 
immediately before the start of their concert they drew a blank. As the Investor and 
the Chairman explain: 
“When BIGsoft went to all of the usual suspects, i.e., the market leaders in 
online payments, none of them would touch this project; they wouldn’t have 
come anywhere near it. When BIGsoft asked us what experience we had, 
ultimately the answer was ‘None, but what options have you got?’… 
Eventually, the most robust stable…part of the whole system was our 
payment solution.” 
                                                          
5 BIGsoft is one of the largest software companies in the world.  
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“It was a very ambitious project because it had to be run on a new BIGsoft … 
server platform that at the time was a beta version. We did not have enough 
experience in the area of project management and in working with foreign 
partners. Nevertheless, our work was well received by BIGsoft as we 
successfully implemented their first industrial solution.” 
Orders followed from the credibility this won, and with them came further positive 
references and case studies. The necessity to justify the location of UKsoft’s 
production center (MDsoft) in an “exotic” location receded. In the UK market, where 
the concept of off-shore and near-shore sourcing of software development was 
already thoroughly legitimate, only the specific choice of Moldova needed to be 
justified, and referenceable success proved to be sufficient to achieve legitimation. 
5 Theoretical Reflections 
MDsoft faced the challenge of establishing both cognitive legitimacy and socio-
political legitimacy [15]. That is, the company had to frame and communicate its own 
identity and mission in such a way that interested parties could understand it as a 
rational and coherent enterprise. It also needed to position itself socio-politically as an 
initiative that was appropriate and valid in the Moldovan context. Strategies of 
cognitive legitimation centered on establishing the credentials of the founders and the 
business model, and on framing the company’s mission, in part at least, as the pursuit 
of excellence. 
The above challenge was amplified by the emerging state of the industry and of the 
economy within which MDsoft started operating. Related to the new sector of the 
economy, as theorized elsewhere [21], MDsoft pursued the creation legitimation 
strategy thus contributing to the creation and legitimation of new laws and norms, 
new values and expectations, as well as new business models and operating practices. 
As to the emerging state of the economy, MDsoft had to overcome the country-of-
origin effect in order to mitigate the liability of foreignness [43].  
In this quest for legitimacy, the data reveal several legitimation strategies adopted 
by MDsoft. First, MDsoft designed a robust business model targeting internal 
(employees) and external stakeholders. MDsoft did so, for example, by providing 
competitive salaries and continuous professional education for its employees, paying 
all taxes and complying with all laws and norms, achieving internationally recognized 
certification, and engaging in community/charity activities. In contrast to earlier 
findings according to which entrepreneurs in their pursuit of robust design shall 
decide, among other things, which details to hide from view altogether [27], MDsoft 
decided from the start to operate openly and transparently. 
Second, MDsoft engaged in theorizing its business model. More specifically, it 
engaged in persuasive argumentation [26] invoking familiar cues and scripts, such as 
referring to the success of Indian and Central European software companies. At the 
same time, it engaged in political negotiations [26] promoting and defending 
incentive and operating mechanisms aimed to make the sector of the economy 
efficient and eventually successful. Being integral to institutional change [24], our 
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data suggest theorizing is also integral to institutional experimentation when an 
industry emerges and tries to achieve its legitimacy threshold.  
At the same time, MDsoft aggressively pursued a technology legitimation strategy 
[23] in order to overcome the liability of foreignness, especially with reference to the 
country-of-origin effect. Of all the other internal and external legitimation strategies 
available to international new ventures [23], the data point to technology legitimation 
strategy as the strategy that contributes to rapid and successful internationalization of 
the new venture.  
The above legitimation strategies were aimed at establishing both cognitive 
legitimacy and socio-political legitimacy. Although these legitimation strategies were 
pursued concurrently, their effect on the acquisition of cognitive legitimacy and 
socio-political legitimacy is path-dependent. According to our data, there is a time-lag 
of three or four years between the acquisition of cognitive legitimacy and socio-
political legitimacy. The data also suggest a cause-effect relationship between the two 
legitimacies, with cognitive legitimacy leading to socio-political legitimacy. We thus 
conjecture that the relationship between cognitive legitimacy and socio-political 
legitimacy is inherently temporal and that the acquisition of socio-political legitimacy 
is positively associated with the acquisition of cognitive legitimacy.  
We further argue that the acquisition of socio-political legitimacy is prerequisite to 
the acquisition of legitimacy threshold. Nationally, according to the data, MDsoft 
reached legitimacy threshold when it won its legal battles on the disputes over VAT 
and exporting software products. At the international level, MDsoft reached 
legitimacy threshold when it won and successfully delivered a software solution for 
one of the largest software companies in the world. Drawing on estimates of new 
venture survival after three years [44], we argue the acquisition of socio-political 
legitimacy is critical for passing that survival threshold.  
The above mentioned strategic legitimation efforts by MDsoft were also directed 
towards changing and creating new structural meanings [29] that helped the new, 
emerging sector of the economy reach what we call industry legitimation threshold. 
The data suggest the industry legitimation threshold was achieved when the 
lawmakers made the ICT sector one of the country priority sectors and introduced a 
long-term tax relief package for software companies. In contrast to earlier findings 
[28] according to which industry norms and practices ought to be legitimate, credible 
and valued before a new venture can conform to them and eventually legitimate, our 
data suggest that the new venture may actually drive the process of industry 
legitimation by legitimating, achieving legitimacy threshold first nationally at meso 
and micro levels as well as internationally.  
From the social construction of reality point of view [45], the emergence of a new 
industry or sector of the economy could be seen as a process whereby legitimation 
and institutionalization alternate each other and during which the bonds between the 
two are created or loosened up. In this context, we define legitimation as a process 
during which structural meanings are changed and/or created at micro and meso 
levels in order to achieve cognitive legitimacy and forge strong bonds with 
institutionalization. We define institutionalization as a process during which new 
structural meanings have strong traction at the macro level, making the bonds 
between legitimation and institutionalization loosen up, eventually leading to socio-
political legitimacy. 
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6 Conclusion 
To achieve cognitive legitimacy and socio-political legitimacy in an emerging 
industry located in an emerging economy, and successfully internationalize, an INV 
shall (i) design a robust business model targeting both internal and external 
stakeholders, (ii) engage in persuasive argumentation invoking familiar cues and 
scripts, (iii) engage in political negotiations promoting and defending incentive and 
operating mechanisms, and (iv) overcome the country-of-origin effect by pursuing 
technology legitimation strategy. We advocate for more theory-building research at 
this intersection of legitimation and INVs within emerging and established industries 
as well as emerging and established economies in order to advance international 
entrepreneurship theory.  
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